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This paper presents a framework to study the historical development of the relationship between science and society. 
We elaborate this relationship as a contract that specifies the mission of scientific research, the rationales for public 
support for science, and the conditions under which scientists work. These three structural elements will always be 
part of the contract, but their specific content can vary. The credibility cycle, as a model for scientific practice, helps 
to describe and understand the consequences of a changing contract for the work of individual scientists. A brief case 
study of chemistry in the Netherlands demonstrates the usefulness of the framework. We show how concepts of 
relevance have changed since 1975 and how this affects the practice of academic chemistry. 
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1. Introduction 
When is scientific research ‘societally relevant’? Is research relevant when it yields knowledge about an urgent 
problem such as global warming? Is it relevant when societal stakeholders are involved? Is it relevant when 
industrial companies are willing to pay for it? Or is it relevant by definition, thanks to the cultural value of scientific 
activities? The issue of relevance clearly is a complicated one. It seems that no straightforward answer is possible to 
the questions above, and there is not even a common definition of societal relevance.  
Relevance is central in the relationship between science and society. In a basic sense, society pays for 
science and expects something in return, value for money (figure 1). This value can have all types of appearances. A 
variety of terms is used here, like ‘quality’, ‘excellence’, ‘innovation’, ‘expertise’, ‘valorisation’, ‘dissemination’ and 
‘relevance’ to give content to it. From an analytical perspective, however, these terms can be grouped under the 
common heading ‘relevance’, pointing to the essential principle of exchange that the knowledge scientists produce 
should have value to society.  
 
 
Figure 1. Very schematic picture of the relationship between science and society 
 
The relationship between science and society is said to be changing. Various approaches have been proposed to 
describe the current dynamics in science systems, such as Post-Academic Science (Ziman, 2000), Mode 2 
knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994) and the Triple Helix of university-government-industry relations 
(Leydesdorff and Meyer, 2006). All these approaches refer to an increasing orientation towards the production of 
‘relevant’ or ‘applicable’ knowledge (Hessels and Van Lente, 2008). They observe an enhanced aspiration of 
scientific research to contribute to the solution of societal problems and to support innovations to facilitate economic 
growth. This development is assumed to relate to profound changes in the relationship between science and the other 
societal spheres: the state, the market and civil society. Scholars report that interactions between traditional 
institutions are intensifying (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), to such an extent that the boundaries have become 
blurred  (Nowotny et al., 2001). Due to the limits on resources available, governments can no longer afford 
unconditional support for basic science (Ziman, 1994) and demand value for money, that is, relevant knowledge. In 
the meanwhile, knowledge becomes an increasingly valuable economic resource, and global competition has forced 
industry to outsource basic research (De Wit et al., 2007). In all these bodies of literature relevance plays a role, but 
it is not in the centre of attention. 
Given its importance in the relationship between science and society we conceive that the notion of 
relevance deserves further elaboration. The current paper is an attempt to clarify how considerations of relevance are 
intertwined with scientific practice. Our second aim is to develop a framework to study the historical development of 
the science-society relationship.  
It is mistaken to consider the stress on relevance as a new phenomenon (Rip, 1997). Since the scientific 
revolution in the 17th century there has always been a notion of relevance of science in place which legitimized and 
mediated the operation of the science system (Martin, 2003; Pestre, 2003). Intimate interactions between science, 
invention and entrepreneurship were, for example, already important in the British industrial revolution (Freeman, 
1997). The notion of a ‘singular science’, one model of doing and organizing science, like Mode 1 knowledge 
production, is historically incorrect (Pickstone, 2007). Anyway, Mode 1 may have shown an increase - or even a 
‘lock-in’ (Rip, 2000) - at the expense of research with Mode 2 features after WWII. In this paper we will corroborate 
the claim that the idea of relevance is not new, but that definitions of what relevance entails have shifted and may 
continue to shift. By focusing on ‘relevance’ we will address the actual, and in fact perennial, question how science 
relates to society. What does it mean for scientific activities and outcomes to be relevant? How is relevance defined 
and measured? When and how does the stress on relevance affect scientific practices?  
money 
‘value for money’ 
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   Our argument will proceed as follows. In the next section we will introduce the notion that the relationship 
between science and society can be seen as a contract. A contract defines the relation between two parties by settling 
privileges and obligations. We address the usage of this notion both in political philosophy and in the sociology of 
science. In section 3 we elaborate the basic elements of the contract and develop a framework for studying it. The 
framework includes the ‘credibility cycle’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) as a model for scientific practice. Section 4 
demonstrates the value of this framework in a case study of chemistry in the Netherlands. We conclude with a 
critical reflection (section 5). 
 
2.  A contract between science and society 
It is a truism that science is not just useful for its own sake but also for society in a broad sense. ‘Societal relevance’ 
relates to expectations that society, in the end, will benefit from the outcomes of scientific research, in terms of 
economic competitiveness, cultural enrichment or social progress. Such expectations are a crucial condition for 
public support for science: why would society pay for science, if it can not expect its outcomes to be relevant? The 
ideas of the benefits attached to relevance have profoundly changed over the course of the last decades, or centuries, 
but this does not change the point that society eventually will benefit from science.  
Numerous writings about the science systems and its changes employ the idea of a (tacit) contract. 
Baldursson (1995), Elzinga (1997), Martin (2003) and Jasanoff (2005) use the notion of a contract to discuss the 
changing relation between science and society in comparable ways. Although there are differences between them 
regarding the approach, scope and size of their studies, their diagnoses are roughly similar. They start with the 
‘Endless frontier’ contract, which has appeared arisen right after WWII. The dominant view on science of this period 
is associated with Vannevar Bush’s report ‘Science, the Endless Frontier’ (Bush, 1945). Based on the experiences 
with the Manhattan project, Bush advised the President to pursue a clear distinction between pure/basic and 
applied/technological research, according to the linear model of innovation. In this contract, basic research is self-
regulated and should not be disturbed by outside steering, while applied research is socially mandated and subject to 
immediate questions about relevance and external steering. This division is institutionalized by two categories of 
funding agencies: basic research councils headed by scientists and sectoral funding agencies mandated by different 
ministries. 
  For several reasons, their arguments continue, this contract is currently under attack. One of the factors for 
this is science’s own success in external contexts (Baldursson, 1995). Given the enormous impact science can have 
on sectors like healthcare and agriculture, society increasingly desires to co-determine its directions. Furthermore, 
innovation studies have shown that the linear model of innovation is inadequate and call for a systemic approach 
(Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). Society demands ‘strategic research’ (Irvine and Martin, 1984; Rip, 2004) or ‘targeted 
research’, new categories of basic research that combine internal scientific quality with external societal relevance 
(Elzinga, 1997). Science-industry relationships intensify, science policy becomes strategic and funding arrangements 
have an increasing mission orientation (Ziman, 1994; Gibbons et al., 1994; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). A 
new contract seems to be emerging in which science’s autonomy is increasingly constrained. The contract authors 
(Baldursson, 1995; Elzinga, 1997) (Jasanoff, 2005; Martin, 2003) only sketch the contours; none of them is sure yet 
about the nature of this emerging contract.  
  Michael Gibbons (1999) deviates somewhat from the authors cited above; he uses the contract notion in a 
more normative way. He argues that the prevailing contract which ‘was set up to sustain the production of reliable 
knowledge’, is not adequate anymore. Given the changes Gibbons observes (increasing societal complexity, 
convergence of university and industrial research, rise of Mode 2), a new contract is needed to ensure the production 
of ‘socially robust knowledge’. This is knowledge of which the validity is achieved through involving an extended 
group of experts, including lay ‘experts’. This knowledge is valid not only inside but also outside laboratories and is 
less likely to be contested than knowledge which is merely ‘reliable’. For Gibbons, entering into the new contract 
involves embracing the rise of Mode 2 and contextualized knowledge production: ‘(...) science must leave the ivory 
tower and enter the agora’ (p. C84).  
Note that the authors discussed so far use the notion of a science-society contract metaphorically. In this way 
they escape from the duty to clarify the content of the contract. They use the ‘science-society contract’ as a heading 
for speaking about the relation between science and society, but they do not explicate how to conceive such a 
contract. Although the idea of a contract is indeed a metaphor for an accomplished and negotiated relationship, we 
think it is useful to stretch the metaphor a bit further and examine the content of the contract between science and 
society. So, how to describe the parties involved and how to describe their rights and obligations? 
  By this we continue the route taken by Guston and Kenniston (1994) who take the idea of contract bit more 
literal:   5 
‘Science and the technology that it spawns are viewed as the cornerstone of our past, the strength of our present, 
and the hope of our future. An unofficial contract between the scientific community and society has arisen from 
these beliefs. This contract confers special privileges and freedoms on scientists, in the expectation that they will 
deliver great benefits to society as a whole’ (Representative George Brown (D-CA), 1992: p. 781, as cited by 
Guston and Kenniston (1994)). 
They continue with a further specification of the science-society contract as follows:  
1.  it ‘implies two distinct parties, each with different interests, who come together to reach a formal agreement 
on some common goal’ 
2.  a contract is negotiated, ‘arrived at through a series of exchanges in which each party tries to secure the 
most advantageous terms’ 
3.  a contract ‘suggests the possibility of conflict – or at least disparity of interests’ 
4.  ‘contracts can be renegotiated if conditions change for either party’ (p. 5) 
According to Guston and Kenniston there are two main features of the science-society contract (Guston and 
Kenniston, 1994). First, the scientific community provides a public good: research outcomes. The private sector, as a 
rule, will underinvest in research because it is difficult to appropriate the return on investment. Second, special 
arrangements balance the responsibilities between government and science: the government invests in a public good, 
but it delegates the actual conduct of the research to other institutions. The scientific community is responsible for 
‘producing’ research, discoveries and new technologies. But the government’s delegation is not a gift; its financial 
support is tied to specific terms and conditions
1. 
Science is not an independent sub-system of society. Because its viability depends on support from other 
societal actors, science has the responsibility to continuously demonstrate its right to exist. In the relationship 
between science and society, both parties have expectations of each other. Society expects to benefit from the 
outcomes of scientific research. Science expects its support to be sustained and not to be tied to increasing 
constraints or conditions. Central in the relationship is the delegation of a task. To facilitate effective execution of 
research, society has appointed a particular party and made her responsible for it
2. 
  A small excursion to the philosophy of science can contribute to the understanding of this relationship. The 
basic idea of delegation and the concomitant social order was first raised by Thomas Hobbes in his work on a ‘social 
contract’. His social contract concerns the mutual transfer of rights, which transform man’s ‘natural condition’ into a 
situation with politico-juridical order. The natural condition is the disastrous situation in which humanity would be if 
there was no contract. Because man is intrinsically self-interested, this is a war of all against all, in which life is 
‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 2003). There is no moral code at all; everyone can claim the right 
on anything, including someone else’s body. Hobbes claims, however, that two fundamental ‘laws of nature’ can be 
rationally deduced which apply in this situation:  
1.  ‘that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain 
it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war’ 
2.  in order to secure the advantages of peace, ‘that a man be willing, when others are so too… to lay down this 
right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men 
against himself’ 
 
So first, everyone should strive for peace as long as that seems a viable option. When this is not possible, however, 
everything is allowed which is needed to defend oneself. Second, however, everybody should be ready to give up his 
rights to a certain extent if others do the same, to the benefit of all. The second law creates the possibility of a social 
contract. The contract involves the voluntary transfer of rights for one’s own good. In principle people transfer their 
rights to each other in symmetrical one-to-one transaction. In a state created by a social contract, however, numerous 
persons have all transferred their rights to the collective. The state is then represented by a sovereign, who is allowed 
                                                 
1 Like the other authors, Guston and Kenniston argue that the social contract is undergoing change and may need to be 
replaced by a new one. However, they address this issue specifically in an American context and identify a different threat: 
decreasing public confidence in the integrity of scientists. This integrity crisis does not have our main interest. This issue is not as 
hot in Europe as in the USA (Jasanoff, 2005). Moreover, Guston and Kenniston regard the contract as an agreement of science 
with government, while we are interested in society in the broader sense.  
2 This task delegation can also be analysed using Principal-Agent Theory (Van der Meulen, B.J.R., 1998. Science policies as 
principal–agent games: Institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science. Research policy 
27, 397-414.; Braun, D., 2003. Lasting tensions in research policy-making - a delegation problem. Science and Public Policy 30 
(5), 309-321.), but this asymmetrical approach to the science-society relationship tends to overemphasise the government’s power 
in structuring the relationship, leaving limited space for scientists’ power in coproducing the norms and values governing the task 
delegation.   6 
by the majority to act on the people’s behalves. This implies that any member (subject) of the state authorizes the 
sovereign’s judgments and acts as if they were his own. All of this serves to keep the peace, both within the 
community and with the external world.    
  The thought experiment of Hobbes on ‘contract’ can be extrapolated to science.
3 A set of agreements about 
the rights and obligations of science can be described which aim to facilitate a productive task delegation (Braun, 
2003). The agreements make up a contract, similar to the social contract as introduced by Hobbes. Like Hobbes’ 
sovereign receives a mandate to fulfil a particular function to the benefit of all, science receives a mandate to carry 
out research. Similar to Hobbes’ imaginary ‘natural condition’, one can think of a society in which everybody has 
the right to produce knowledge (table 1). Here, the task to conduct research or to develop expertise is not delegated 
to anybody in particular, so every member of the community can claim to possess truthful knowledge. This is 
probably an undesirable situation, everybody holding his own beliefs about nature. It may lead to unproductiveness 
and ineffectiveness, as there is limited consensus to build on for making decisions or developing technology. The 
citizens will spend a lot of time and energy on exchanging views, peacefully or violently. 
In contemporary societies, however, science has a privileged position in the production of truth, comparable 
to the way Hobbes’ sovereign has a monopoly on violence. All people have transferred their right to conduct 
research to science. Of course, nobody will forbid anyone else to carry out research, but only scientists have 
uncontested cognitive authority. Similar to Hobbes’ thought experiment, we can think of an act in which all 
members of society transfer their rights on research to each other and subsequently appointing one institution to 
which this task is delegated. The task formulation of this institution (science) is what we call the contract
4. Of course, 
such an event of collectively deciding that the task of conducting research can best be delegated to one particular 
institution - and rationally choosing what would be the most effective working procedure - has never factually 
occurred in history, but the idea of such an event can greatly help to clarify what science is and how it relates to 
society. 
 
Table 1. A comparison between Hobbes’ social contract and the contract between science and society. 
  Social contract (Hobbes)  Contract science-society 
State of nature  War  Irrationality 
Contractants  All people  All people 
Aim  Peace  Truth / knowledge 
Sovereign  Political ruler (dictator)  Science 
Transferred right  Violence  Research / cognitive authority 
Derived rights  Various (3-19)  Academic freedom, respect, education... 
Resulting relationship  Total dependence  Right to object 
 
To conclude, the notion of a contract provides a possible route to enhance our understanding of relevance 
and of the changing science-society relationship. However, to date no detailed account of the content of this contract 
is available. In the following, we will take up the challenge and develop a framework. The leading question in this 
undertaking is: what are the minimum ingredients of a contract between science and society? Here, we are less 
concerned with the specific agreements between both actors on a particular time and place than with the generic 
structure of the contract. What are the basic issues to settle in a contract?  
 
3. A framework to examine the relationship between science and society 
The aim of this paper is to develop a framework to study the changing relationship between science and society, in 
particular with regard to societal relevance of scientific research. To this end, we need three ingredients: a model of 
the relationship between science and society, a model of the science system itself, and an understanding of how the 
dynamics of both models mutually relate. The figure below (fig. 2) is a concise presentation of our framework. It 
contains two major concepts: the contract between science and society and the credibility cycle. As we will explain 
                                                 
3 The prefix ‘social’ used by several scholars (Jasanoff, 2005; Elzinga, 1997; Gibbons, 1999) seems redundant. This word is 
inherited from the political philosophy debate, which started from questions about the conditions for the possibility of social 
stability. If one speaks about the contract between science and society, this aspect is not present anymore. 
4 Note that this concept of the science-society contract differs from the one of Guston and Kenniston, who consider the contract as 
a result of the negotiations between two existing parties: science and government. In our concept, science is the product rather 
than a precondition for the contract.   7 
below (section 3.1), we use the credibility cycle as a model for the functioning of the science system, as it describes 
the basic sequence of activities of individual scientists. On an aggregated level, we conceive the relationship 
between science and society in terms of a contract (3.2). The two-directional arrow between the two shows that the 




Figure 2. A framework for studying the changing relation between science and society 
 
3.1 Credibility cycle 
Sociology of science indicates that scientists are not primarily driven by financial incentives and rewards, but rather 
by a desire for recognition and reputation. In science, ‘the need to acquire positive reputations from other scientists 
is a crucial factor controlling what tasks are carried out and how, and how they are evaluated’ (Whitley, 2000) (p. 
25). Work is organised and controlled through reputations. Scientific activities are carried out with a view to 
convincing fellow researchers of the importance and significance of the results and hence enhancing one’s own 
reputations. A scientist’s status in his employment organisation (university) depends on his reputation, because this 
is a key factor in acquiring jobs and resources. 
The concept of the ‘credibility cycle’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) explains how struggles for reputation 
influence the behaviour of individual scientists. Similar to Whitley’s notion of reputation, credibility refers to the 
ability ‘actually to do science’ (p. 198). Scientific behaviour can be described as a cycle of conversions of different 
types of credibility. The quest for credibility constitutes the major motivation for a scientist’s actions. Scientists 
invest time and money expecting to acquire data that can support arguments. These are written down in articles, 
which may yield recognition from colleagues. Based on this, scientists hope to be able to receive new funding, from 
which they buy new equipment (or hire staff) which will help to gather data again, etc. Conceived in this way, the 
research process can be depicted as a cycle in which conversions take place between money, data, prestige, 
credentials, problem areas, argument, papers, and so on (see figure 3). 
Contract between 
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Figure 3. The credibility cycle, adapted from Latour and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) 
 
The constructivist studies of science from which the credibility cycle originates are traditionally seen in opposition 
to Merton’s sociology of science, which stresses the importance of norms in structuring scientific practice. However, 
these two traditions are not necessarily in contradiction as each conversion can be conceived as governed by a set of 
norms. Only certain types of data have enough ‘validity’ or ‘reliability’ to be converted into arguments. In turn, 
arguments need to have strength in order to enable conversion into a publication. Recognition is only awarded to 
articles which have been accepted in prestigious journals, or – increasingly – which are cited by other scholars. In a 
similar fashion, all other conversions in the cycle are also governed by prescriptions and standards. The existence of 
norm systems facilitates the conversions which constitute the credibility cycle. In this sense the whole cycle can only 
exist thanks to a set of shared norms and values.  
This description may give the impression that peer judgment is the central determinant for success in this 
model, but that is not necessarily the case. In the traditional understanding of science, most conversions may be 
governed primarily by internal scientific procedures. The model does not exclude the possibility, however, of other 
procedures or norm sets dominating. Although Latour and Woolgar (1979) have introduced the cycle as a timeless, 
generic model for scientific activities, several scholars have already shown that it is useful starting point for 
describing changes in the science system. Packer and Webster (Packer and Webster, 1996) argue that the cycle needs 
to be extended in order to accommodate patenting activities, which are of increasing importance for academic 
scientists. Arie Rip (Rip, 1994) uses the credibility cycle to analyze how the role research councils has developed 
over the years. Garcia and Sanz-Menéndez (Garcia and Sanz-Menéndez, 2005) use the credibility cycle to show the 
importance of competition for funding in contemporary science systems
5. They argue for a performance indicator 
based on success in funding acquisition to complement bibliometric indicators.  
The credibility cycle is a valuable analytical tool for studying scientific practice. Its precise composition, 
however, is a historical contingency rather than a necessity. Figure 3 can not be seen as a timeless representation of 
science. What conversions are part of the cycle, which ones are most important and what are the guiding norms and 
values are all questions for empirical investigation. For instance, Merton’s original formulation of the fundamental 
norms (Communism, Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organized Scepticism) (Merton, 1973) is nowadays 
contested. Ethnographic laboratory studies have had difficulties empirically discerning these norms. Scientists turn 
out to be occupied with building networks and alliances of interested actors rather than being disinterested and 
skeptical (Latour, 1987). The production of truth seems to be more an act of creating interest for one’s own 
propositions than of altruistic devotion to the progress of human understanding. These objections, however, do not 
imply that Merton was completely wrong. Politics and power-play exist in every sector of human activity. If one is 
interested in the distinctive characteristics of science, one has to look below the surface of politics. Being interested 
                                                 
5 Garcia and Sanz-Menéndez, however, do not argue that the credibility cycle has changed in the course of time or denounce the 
adequacy of the model of Latour and Woolgar. They rather use the cycle to draw attention to the importance of competition for 
research funding for scientific reputations. 
Data 
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in the historical development of the contract between science and society, we regard the ethos of science as a 
historical contingency. Although Merton’s CUDOS concept seems a highly idealized picture of reality, we would 
not reject its validity beforehand. It may turn out to be a convenient framework to discuss the ethos of science at 
some point in history, to be contrasted with more recent developments. This may be done using Ziman’s alternative 
PLACE framework (Ziman, 2000, p. 78-79). John Ziman argues that the CUDOS concept helps to contrast academic 
science with industrial science (as conducted in industrial labs or governmental research institutes), which is 
characterized by ‘PLACE’ norms: ‘It produces proprietary knowledge that is not necessarily made public. It is 
focused on local technical problems rather than on general understanding. Industrial researchers act under 
managerial authority rather than as individual. Their research is commissioned to achieve practical goals, rather than 
undertaken in the pursuit of knowledge. They are employed as expert problem solvers, rather than for their personal 
creativity.’ In Ziman’s diagnosis, the division between both spheres is currently blurring, giving rise to ‘post-
academic’ or ‘post-industrial’ research. 
 
3.2 Contract science-society 
A contract defines a ‘moral universe’, which indicates the positions and the mutual relationships of the actors 
involved. If one thinks about the relation between a mother and her child, there are many norms and values involved. 
In contemporary western societies, some central values are probably love, development and safety. Some norms: the 
mother should feed her child, the child should obey its mother, and the mother should support her child and stand by 
its side when it happens to be in trouble. Although the norms just presented are beyond dispute, not all are recorded 
anywhere. Some of them are even hardly ever communicated. Still people generally expect each other to respect 
these rules. Explicit and implicit norms together shape a moral universe which indicates how mothers and children 
relate to each other. 
In the same vein, the contract between science and society is the whole of all implicit and explicit 
agreements between science and societal parties. It arranges what science should do, why it should do this, and what 
are the appropriate conditions (see figure 4). In the following, we will give a general description of the three main 
elements of the contract. We do not claim to know the precise content of the articles, as this changes in time. Our 
claim rather concerns the general ‘structure’ of the contract, which is stable. In any time, or at any place, a contract 
specifying the societal mandate of science has to address three central questions: what, why and how? 
 
 
Figure 4. The general composition of the contract between science and society 
 
1. Science’s mission: producing relevant knowledge 
The mission of science is to provide a public good: relevant research outcomes. Science’s duty is to produce 
knowledge and to deliver it in the form of communication (publications, presentations) or artefacts. This task is 
delegated by the community. In return for these duties, science also has particular rights, such as: stability (job 
opportunities), autonomy (freedom for scientists to choose the best way to reach particular goals) and societal 
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as a separate norm here. Of course one can argue that scientists are expected to be excellent in what they are doing
6. 
But in our concept, this is only instrumental in successfully fulfilling their mission of producing relevant knowledge 
and not a goal in itself.  
 
2. Rationales for funding science 
The contract also describes why science deserves support. Many different (combinations of) arguments are possible, 
but most of them relate to the concepts of societal relevance listed above. First, science is seen as a cultural good. 
Second, it is needed to sustain a system of higher education. Third, it is believed that the market sector will 
underinvest in basic research in spite of its economic importance, so a public research system is needed. Fourth, 
public science enables the government or consortia of various actors to demand specific knowledge which is of a 
general interest (like expertise which can support decision making or strategic knowledge which may lead to 
innovations).   
 
3. Conditions 
Third, the contract contains agreements about the conditions under which scientists work. One can assume that 
science’s organisation is attuned to its mission. A basic feature of the way science is currently organized is the 
nested hierarchy of research groups in faculties in universities. Another agreement concerns the way money is 
distributed to scientific researchers, in which intermediary organisations have a central role. This is not the right 
place for a complete description of all agreements concerning science’s organisation. Here, we just want to 
emphasise that the current contract includes specific instruments (‘organizational devices’) which aim to enhance the 
quality and / or relevance of research, like earmarked funding and performance assessments
7. 
 
In a stable contract the three elements are strongly interlinked. Concepts of ‘relevance’ strongly relate to prevailing 
ideas about the legitimacy of funding science. Moreover, the way science is organized depends on the precise 
mission it should fulfill. For this reason, a history of the contract has to take into account the dynamics of all three 
elements. In table 2, we list the characteristics of each element that we regard as structural and variable. 
 




general structure  variables 
What?  mission: research  
norms: relevance 
meaning of relevance 
Why?  values: science is good  specific rationales 
How?  organisational devices to enhance quality 
and relevance 
specific devices at place 
the norms governing the devices 
 
 
3.3 Relation between contract and cycle 
The contact between science and society has an enabling constraining relation with the credibility cycle. Rather than 
assuming a uni-directional causality, we regard the developments on both levels being in co-evolution. Both the 
contract between science and society and the credibility cycle deal with norms. The contract describes the ethos of 
science on an aggregated level; the credibility cycle describes when and how individual scientists are confronted 
with various norms (figure 5). Obviously both norm systems are strongly related. The generic contract ultimately is 
the product of interactions of individual scientists with each other and with societal actors. The norms it contains are 
therefore co-shaped by the norms governing at the individual level. Conversely, developments on the aggregated 
                                                 
6 For example, in the general protocol for research evaluations in the Netherlands (VSNU / NWO / KNAW, 2003. Standard 
Evaluation Protocol 2003-2009 for Public Research Organisations. .) quality and relevance stand next to each other as two of the 
four central criteria, the others being viability and productivity. 
7 Most of these devices are often referred to as ‘practices of quality control’ (e.g. Hemlin, S., Rasmussen, S.B., 2006. The Shift in 
Academic Quality Control. Science, technology and human values 31 (2), 173, 126p.). But in the present context, this notion is a 
little confusing, because these devices do not only control quality, but also relevance.   11 
(national) level influence the credibility cycle. 
 
Figure 5. The collective contract of all scientists with society in relation to their individual credibility cycles. 
 
4. Application to chemistry case 
In this section we demonstrate the suitability of our approach in a concise case study on chemistry in the 
Netherlands
8. Our story starts with the post-war situation, previously referred to as the ‘Science, the endless 
frontier’-contract. First we will describe the changes in the rationales, the mission and the conditions as specified in 
the contract. Then we will address the changing credibility cycle. 
 
Rationales 
In the 1950s and 1960s there are two dominant rationales for funding chemical research: its necessity for the training 
of new R&D-workers and (less importantly) the cultural value of basic research (see table 4). Chemical industry, 
with which academic chemistry always had strong bonds (Homburg and Palm, 2004), has a strong interest in highly 
educated researchers. Industry tends to regard universities primarily as an educational system with the primary 
mission to supply a steady stream of highly skilled researchers (Homburg, 2003).  For the government the 
economical importance of this sector is the reason to found SON in 1956, the foundation for chemical research in the 
Netherlands, which provides support to basic chemical research with the training of young scientists as its primary 
aim. In the 1970s an additional rationale emerges for supporting chemical research, namely the awareness of 
environmental problems which call for chemical expertise. The budget cuts on basic research in industry in the 
1980s give rise to a new rationale for supporting academic chemistry relating to its potential contribution to 
technological innovations
9. Chemical industry does not only desire to benefit from academic research in terms of 
educated staff, but also in terms of applications of the knowledge produced
10 (De Wit et al., 2007; Van Helvoort, 
2005). In the 1990s the notion of sustainable development becomes dominant in rationales for funding (chemical) 
research. This concept connects several previous rationales by combining economic growth with environmental and 
social development. Around the turn of the century, a new notion is added to the rationales, the innovation system. 
Innovation studies have shown that innovation is the product of interactions of a variety of actors who are part of the 
innovation system. This gives specific content to the argument to fund academic research. Maintaining a healthy 
                                                 
8 This case study is based on document analysis and in-depth interviews with scientists, policy-makers and other societal 
stakeholders. A more elaborated analysis of this case will be published separately. 
9 The first foresight study (1980) of chemistry, commissioned by the minister of science policy concludes that academic 
chemistry should define its research goals more sharply and that the contacts with industry deserve intensification.  
10 The interest of chemical industry in academic research is also visible in an advisory report by VNCI (association of chemical 
industry) and KNCV (professional organization of chemists) (KNCV & VCNI, 1984. Toekomstig Chemisch Onderzoek: Een 
uitwerking van het rapport Wagner I voor de Chemie.) that argues for increasing industrial steering of academic research and 
suggests a set of six ‘priority fields’ as a guideline in the conditional funding process. 
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innovation system becomes a goal as such, which implies that universities deserve support thanks to their central 
position in this system.  
   
Mission 
In the first postwar decades, the mission of academic chemistry is to conduct excellent basic research. Good research 
is research which succeeds to train its executers with skills they can later use in an industrial context. Although it is 
quite common for industrial labs to pursue basic research as well, the academic environment is regarded to have 
some special characteristics that facilitate the development of scientific skills. Relevant research simply equals 
excellent research. Chemical research is regarded as relevant by definition, given the importance of chemical 
industry for the Dutch economy. In the 1970s, when governmental science policy is introduced, an additional 
mission of serving societal needs emerges
11. For chemistry this implies to produce knowledge which is useful not 
only in chemical industry, but also in domains like agriculture and healthcare. More specifically, chemistry is 
expected to contribute to the solution of environmental issues. In the 1980s chemistry’s relevance is rephrased as 
delivering applicable knowledge. There remains a place for basic research as well, but this is justified merely as a 
necessary condition for the existence of good applicable research. During the 1990s the boundary between basic and 
applied research starts blurring and chemistry’s mission becomes producing ‘strategic knowledge’. Strategic 
research combines aspects of basic and applied research. Strategic knowledge concerns fundamental insights in 
domains of high relevance for economy or society. The domain of ‘sustainability’, which gains importance since its 
introduction in 1987, becomes a major strategic field for chemistry
12. The strategic mission of academic chemistry 
endures in the new millennium as it also fits the innovation system rationales. 
   
Conditions 
In terms of conditions, during the 1950s and 1960s chemical scientists have a high degree of autonomy. The most 
important types of funding (first and second money stream) are distributed without any conditions attached, based on 
considerations of academic quality. In the 1970s scientists are increasingly held account for their work. Although 
they are not yet affected by formal policy measures, chemical researchers need to put more effort in explaining to 
society what they are doing than before. From 1980 onwards, however, a substantial change occurs in the funding of 
chemical science. Faced with the need for budget cuts, the ministry of science, culture and education starts to supply 
part of the first money stream on a conditional base. Moreover, within the second money stream, an increasing share 
is dedicated to application oriented research
13. In addition, an increasingly significant part of all funding stems from 
industrial corporations
14 and the ministry of economic affairs starts to implement a number of innovation 
programmes in specific fields like Carbohydrates and Catalysis
15. These developments continue in the 1990s. The 
second money stream continues to broaden its mission beyond basic research, which is demonstrated by its name 
change in 1998 from ZWO to NWO
16. Another significant event in the 1990s is the institutionalization of 
performance evaluations. In 1996 the first nation-wide quality assessment of chemical science is conducted (VSNU, 
1996), the second in 2002 (VSNU, 2002). Due to the lack of a strict protocol, the evaluators can choose themselves 
to what extent they take into account considerations societal relevance or applications. In practice, they turn out to 
generally ignore this criterion and focus strongly on traditional scientific norms
17. After 2000 chemistry faces the 
                                                 
11 In the first policy paper (1974) by minister Trip, the primary mission of science policy is defined as enhancing the agreements 
of research agenda’s with societal demands. 
12 Foresight studies by OCV (OCV, 1995. Chemie in Perspectief: een verkenning van vraag en aanbod in het chemisch onderzoek, 
Overlegcommissie Verkenningen, Amsterdam ) and by KNCV and VNCI (KNCV & VCNI, 1994. Toekomstig chemisch 
onderzoek: Universitair fundament voor industriële meerwaarde.) both pay significantly more attention to environmental issues 
than their predecessors from the 1980s. 
13 SON, the major chemical research council, starts a program for applied chemical research in 1980, together with the new 
technology foundation STW.  
14 During the 1980s, the number of temporarily paid chemical researchers funded by the ‘third money stream’ rises from about 70 
to 350 (ACC-evaluatiecommissie, 1991. Evaluatie van de universitaire chemie in de jaren '80, ACC/KNAW, Amsterdam.). 
15 The ‘Innovation Oriented Programs’ (IOPs), for example ‘Membranes’ (1983), ‘Carbohydrates’ (1985) and ‘Catalysis’ (1989). 
16 Abbreviations for the organization for Pure Scientific Research and the Dutch organization for Scientific Research, respectively. 
17 This may change, as in the meanwhile a protocol is available (VSNU / NWO / KNAW, 2003. Standard Evaluation Protocol 
2003-2009 for Public Research Organisations. .) and there are attempts to develop more holistic methods that include societal 
relevance (Spaapen, J., Dijstelbloem, H., Wamelink, F., 2007. Evaluating Research in Context, Second edition, COS, The 
Netherlands, The Hague.)   13 
rise of consortia-based funding, large sums of governmental money supplied to collaborative programs of university 
scientists which are monitored by (industrial) user committees
18. 
 
Table 4. The changing contract for chemistry. + signs indicate that these element complement rather than replace already existing 
elements. 









70s  + serving society  + environmental issues  + social accountability 
80s  applicable knowledge  technological innovation  + conditional funding 
+ application oriented funding 
(STW, IOP, contract research) 
+ foresight 
+ scarcity of resources 
90s  strategic knowledge  sustainable development  further prioritization 
ZWO 
→  NWO 
+ performance assessments 
2000+  strategic knowledge  sustainable development 
innovation system 
+ consortia (ACTS, TTI, bsik) 
 
 
In the course of years, the meaning of societal relevance has changed dramatically. It was initially defined in terms 
of education; later in terms of global inequality and environment; in the 1980s in terms of innovation; since the 
1990s in terms of innovation and sustainability. Related, the emphasis in the rationales for funding chemical research 
have shifted from its function to support higher education and its cultural value to the notion that basic research is 
needed to sustain the innovativeness of industry and global markets fail to stimulate private sector basic research. An 
additional rationale that has evolved over the years is the need of chemical expertise for governmental decision 
making about regulations of emissions. The conditions specified in the contract have become increasingly complex. 
Chemists receive less unconditional support. Still the ministry of science provides a certain share of funding without 
specifying how it should be spent, but this ‘basic funding’ is subject to increasing interventions from university 
management
19. Moreover, for a fruitful career, scientists depend on the acquisition of additional funding, from NWO, 
European Framework Programmes or from private companies. Each of these sources involves specified targets and 
requires from researchers to define ex ante the societal significance of the research they propose. Moreover, a couple 
of new devices are at place in order to stimulate the production of good and relevant knowledge: performance 
assessments and foresight activities. 
 
Credibility cycle 
The developments just described have a strong impact on scientific practice, which can be analysed in terms of the 
credibility cycle. The governing set of norms of each conversion is influenced by changes in the contract. Some 
conversions seem solely ruled by the scientific community, but in other cases society deliberately interferes. A 
number of ‘organizational devices’ is present to enhance the relevance of scientific research. These can be connected 
to particular credibility conversions (figure 6). In this case study, we identified five types of these devices: 
1.  earmarked funding 
2.  performance assessments (visitaties) 
3.  university management, (e.g. ‘focus and mass’-policy, promotion criteria) 
4.  foresight activities (e.g. Verkenningscommissies, Sectorraden) 
5.  internal (scientific) procedures of quality control (peer review of scientific papers, selection of candidates 
for academic positions, citation practices) 
These devices are not developed by one party on its own, but are rather created in interaction between science and 
society. The way the devices modify the conversions differs, because the devices are of different nature. Generally, 
however, they have the potential of influencing the norms governing the conversions. This effect can be either 
                                                 
18 E.g. the ACTS-program (Advanced Chemical Technologies for Sustainability) of NWO, the Technological Top Institutes 
funded by the ministry of Economic Affairs and the BSIK-programs (Besluit Subsidies Investeringen Kennisinfrastructuur). 
19 E.g. the current ‘Focus en Massa’ policy.   14 
consolidating or opposing the existing norms. 
 
 
Figure 6. The credibility cycle, adapted from Latour and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). We have indicated at what points 
organisational devices connect to the cycle. 
 
The rise of earmarked funding interferes with the conversion from recognition to money. The criteria connected to 
particular funds determine the possibilities for scientists to obtain money. In this way they co-shape the prevailing 
norms that govern this specific conversion. The availability of a number of strategic programmes for chemical 
research in the Netherlands implies that scientists who are recognized experts in particular fields (like catalysis or 
nano-science) have an advantage in acquiring money. Also the ability to promise practical applications is 
increasingly valued in this conversion. Moreover, this conversion is indirectly influenced by foresight activities. The 
foresight studies on chemistry (1980; 1995) in the Netherlands have had a significant influence on the available 
funding for particular sub-fields
20. 
The procedures for selecting candidates for academic positions influence the conversion of money into staff 
(and equipment). In these procedures normally a combination of various norms is taken into account. Recently, the 
publication and citation records have gained importance here. The most recent trend is that a candidate’s proven 
abilities in funding acquisition are rewarded. Obviously, these developments co-determine how money can be 
transformed into staff.  
  The conversion of staff and equipment into data takes place inside laboratories and other research locations. 
Governing norms seem to be primarily of scientific nature. However, the choice of what data to produce can strongly 
depend on agreements with funding sources and – less explicitly – on societal issues calling for particular scientific 
knowledge.  
  The conversion of data into arguments depends on norms about the characteristics data should possess 
before they can support arguments: reliability, validity. Traditionally, there is little societal interference here. 
                                                 
20 For example, SON’s decision to start funding application oriented research is partly based on the outcomes of the 1980 
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Proponents of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) claim this to change, the public becoming 
increasingly involved in quality assessments of scientific results in fields of social importance, but we have not 
observed this in our case study. 
  The conversion of arguments into articles is strongly ruled by an instrument, but this is of scientific nature: 
peer review. All scientific journals employ such practices of quality control. Peers judge the quality of papers in 
academic terms, without considering their content’s societal relevance. A significant modification of this conversion 
concerns the rising interest of research sponsors, particularly in industrial fields like catalysis, to patent research 
outcomes. This causes a potential delay in publications, due to the scientists’ contractual duty to give their industrial 
partners some time to explore the patentability of their findings. 
  Obtaining recognition based on one’s articles traditionally depends on peer judgment. Scientists informally 
acknowledge each other for the innovativeness of their articles and the degree to which they inspire others. However, 
in the 1980s and 1990s governments have installed performance assessments that formalise the attribution of 
recognition. Bibliometric analyses combined with qualitative judgments from peers (and sometimes also of 
‘knowledge-users’) yield scores for the performance of research groups, programmes and individuals. Interview data 
suggest that these scores increasingly contribute to an individual’s scientific recognition. Although they do not play a 
dominant role yet, the intended involvement of ‘users’ and including the ‘societal relevance’ as a significant criterion 
in these assessments (Spaapen et al., 2007) may considerably modify the conversion of articles into recognition. 
  Performance assessments, including bibliometric analyses, have increased the ‘publish or perish’ norm. 
Although they were started to enhance the societal accountability of scientists, they have increased the need for peer 
recognition rather than the need for societal justification. The development of bibliometric evaluation tools has 
added a quantitative dimension to the conversion from articles to recognition. Originally a means of communication, 
publications have become an end in itself. 
The new mosaic of funding options, partly influenced by foresight activities, cause that only a happy few 
manage to get money without promising applications. In the contract of the 1950s and 1960s, scientists had many 
options for acquiring resources based solely on considerations of originality or scientific relevance, but this has 
become a rarity nowadays. A side effect of the increasing complexity of funding options is that funding acquisition 
today consumes a major share of senior scientists’ time. In the Netherlands most seniors have a guaranteed income 
for themselves, but to make scientific progress they are dependent on junior researchers who are paid mostly from 
project-based sources. This development has also influenced the procedures for selecting candidates for academic 
positions. Scientific publication records still seem to be the major criterion here, but increasingly the candidate’s 
estimated fundraising abilities
21 are rewarded, too. Together the changed conditions under which scientists work 
have strengthened the mutual competition. The pressure to publish and to be cited has intensified
22. Altogether, the 
new credibility cycle has an asymmetrical appearance. At the conversion from recognition to money societal 
relevance is very important, but at most other conversions this criterion hardly plays a role. The result is that the 
norms at different positions in the cycle are conflicting. This works out well in some subfields, like catalysis, in 
which the applicability of basic research is easily demonstrable. But in other fields, like biochemistry, there is a 




To conclude, the idea of a contract to understand the relation between society and science appears to be helpful. One 
can regard the relationship as a negotiated set of rights and obligations for both parties. However, in most writings 
the idea of ‘contract’ tends to remain a metaphor. While this is correct – it is a metaphor, after all - it ignores the 
possibilities to be more specific about the set of rights and obligations, which would enable being more specific 
about changes in the science system. In this paper we intended to attain this higher degree of specificity, by 
discussing the general content of a science-society contract.  
This undertaking enriches the understanding of how scientific practice is influenced by external pressures 
and how internal developments influence science’s relation with society. We have built on dominant approaches in 
the sociology of science like Actor Network Theory that provide a fundamental understanding of scientific practice, 
but less of its changing relationship with society. Our framework facilitates an empirical analysis of such changes, as 
demonstrated in a reflection on the case of chemistry. Moreover, an enhanced understanding of these developments 
is crucial for making sound policy in the field of science and innovation. This is often based on primitive and 
                                                 
21 Important indicators are past acquisitions and networking capacities. 
22 This is confirmed in our interviews with chemical researchers.   16 
unarticulated notions of societal relevance, without a clear understanding of what these entail. Finally, the need to re-
think the relationships between the traditional societal spheres is also apparent from a perspective of reflexive 
modernization (Grin, 2006). Along this line, an enhanced understanding of the science-society relationship can 
support system innovations. 
The framework presented enables to relate changes in the contract between science and society to changes 
in actual scientific practice. We do not presuppose single-directional causality in this relationship. The contract may 
influence the credibility cycle and vice versa. The main merit of our approach is that the dynamics of both are taken 
into account.  
  The ‘relation between science and society’ and ‘scientific practice’ both are vague concepts trying to grasp 
complex pieces of reality. The idea of our approach is to develop a model in which both are reduced to something 
that does justice to reality and at the same time allows for systematic analysis. Our notion of the contract clearly 
articulates the relation between science and society in terms of a limited number of variables. Although many norms 
are at stake in the science-society interaction, we present a condensed framework that captures the most central 
characteristics. Similarly, the credibility cycle does not give a complete overview of all activities involved in 
scientific research. It does, however, describe the general pattern in which all activities have a position. Assuming 
that all scientists’ actions aim to contribute to the conversion of credibility, the form of this cycle becomes a crucial 
factor determining scientific practice. This does not imply structure-determinism. The cycle is not a result of only the 
contract. It should rather be seen as a description of the processes taking place, which are the product of social 
interactions both within science and between science and society. The credibility cycle is no dictating norm system, 
but rather a particular pattern of activities that are necessary for each researcher to produce credible information. 
‘Norms, the socialisation process, deviance, and reward are the consequences of social activities rather than its 
causes’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979)(p. 205). 
  We believe to have demonstrated the usefulness of our framework in a brief case study of chemistry in the 
Netherlands. The framework helped us to identify the ways in which changing concepts of relevance influence 
scientific practice. In our case we have distinguished various ‘organisational devices’, which aim to enhance the 
relevance of scientific research, the most influential ones being earmarked funding and performance assessments. A 
next step is to elaborate this case and to extend the approach to different scientific disciplines and to other national 
contexts. The changing science-society contract can be described based on funding data, foresight studies, advisory 
reports and policy papers, supplemented by interviews. For a thorough study of the credibility cycle in-depth 
interviews with scientists seem the most appropriate data source. 
  It is often assumed that the pressure for relevance has increased over the years. However, relevance has also 
got different meanings. A certain stress on relevance is of all times but the meaning of this notion changes because 
of changing ideas about the potential benefits of scientific research. Here we have introduced a framework that 
enables a systematic study of changing concepts of relevance as products of the interaction between science and 
society. This enables us to disentangle the two parallel developments around relevance, resulting in an enhanced 
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